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Introduction 
l.l  The Competitiveness Rationale. 
During the 1980's there was a general trend towards justifying public support for 
research and development in terms of the impact it would have upon industrial com-
petitiveness.  In  some cases this rationale was applied to the whole spectrum of re-
search activities, but it was most commonly applied to strategic programmes of 
research.  Such programmes were frequently concerned with the so-called 'new tech-
nologies' (information and communications, biotechnology and new materials) and 
often involved new structural forms.  A key feature of such programmes at both na-
tional and Community level was collaboration, both between firms and between 
firms and academic institutions.  The programmes were fonnulated and implemented 
during a period when state intervention in industrial activity was declining.  To em-
phasise that they were not interfering with the market behaviour of firms, the pro-
grammes were described as 'pre-competitive', that is concerned with areas of 
research which in the longer term would have market significance but within which, 
in the interim, firms could work together to create a common body of knowledge 
which they could subsequently exploit separately in competition with their former 
partners, as well as with other firms.  This model of research was based upon percep-
tions of the success of Japanese initiatives, notably the VLSI project where the main 
participants all subsequently gained significantly in the market. The generality of 
this assumption will be questioned later in this report, but as an initial rationale it 
will suffice. Community programmes were part of the trend referred to above. Programmes 
such as ESPRIT and BRITE sought to enhance the competitive performance of dif-
ferent sectors of European industry.  Article 130F of the Single European Act gives as 
the underpinning mtionale for the Fmmework Programme that, 
"The Community's aim shall be to strengthen the scientific and 
technological basis of European industry and to encoumge it to become 
more competitive at international level." 
Individual progmmmes have also adopted enhancement of competitive perform-
ance as part of their objectives but the objectives are not broken down further into a 
verifiable format.  Whether it is possible to be more specific is one of the qustions to 
be addressed by this study but, for the moment, it is sufficient to note the widespread 
and underpinning presence of the competitiveness rationale.  It should also be noted, 
however, that there are a number of other objectives for Community R&D embodied 
in the S.E.A. and hence that not all programmes need embody a contribution to com-
petitiveness in their objectives. 
1.2  Evaluation and Competitiveness. 
Panels appointed to evaluate Community progmmmes have already had to pass 
judgement on the contribution made to competitiveness.  It is instructive to examine 
how the issue was treated in the cases of two large programmes which  e~licitly  ad-
dressed the competitiveness of European industry, ESPRIT-1 and BRITE -. 
Evaluation of the first BRITE programme (1985-1988) 
The evaluation of BRITE contained a section discussing industrial competition 
and the role of technology. While stating that it was essential that a scientific and 
technical culture should be introduced into the European industria~ system, the report 
stated: 
1  Y. Farge et  al. Evaluation of  the first BRITE  programme (1985-1988), Commission of the European 
Communities, July 1988  · 
2  The Review of  ESPRIT 1984-1988. The Report of the ESPRIT Review Board, May 1989 
2 "Boosting competitiveness means reducing production costs and de-
livery times, and improving quality, just as much as developing new 
products and processes.  For BRITE-II, the panel recommends that the 
concept of competitiveness be defined  more clearly  in the call for 
proposals,  and taken into  account more extensively in the selection 
criteria." 
The panel queried the incorpomtion of the concept of pre-competitivity in a re-
search progmmme whose primary goal was to enhance the competitiveness of Euro-
pean industry.  This was in the context of a more geneml criticism of some projects 
being too distant from the market. 
The economic impact of the progmmme was assessed through a questionnaire to 
which 177 out of 445 participants replied, and direct interviews by the panel.  It was 
concluded that most projects should exert a genuine impact on the competitiveness 
of the industries concerned, even if such an impact cannot be estimated correctly. 
The review of ESPRIT 1984-1988 
The review of ESPRIT I began by stressing that the overall strategic goal of the 
progmmme was to provide the European IT industry with the technology base which 
it needs to become and stay competitive with the USA  and Japan in the 1990's.  Com-
ments in the report in this area were genemlly restricted to detailing ways in which 
the technology base was enhanced, and associated matters such as dissemination of 
results.  The benefits of collaborative working were also stressed, as were contribu-
tions to standards. In concluding and looking ahead, the report saw the problems of 
risk aversion in new product investment as the main feature obstructing European in-
dustry compared with the USA and Japan. 
While presenting a general picture of the standing of European industry in the IT 
sector (through trade balance and market share data) the report did not attempt to 
link changes in these to the progmmme. 
General Problems in evaluating the impact of R&D on competitiveness 
As the above examples illustrate, evaluation panels have faced difficulties in deal-
ing with, or even comprehending the competitiveness issue. One reason for this is 
3 that the programmes they are evaluating may represent a necessary step to improve-
ment of competitiveness but they certainly do not represent a sufficient one. An en-
hanced technological base still requires investment and successful entrepreneurial 
activity to support it Products may draw upon multiple sources of knowledge, and 
an R&D project may contribute to the development of a number of products (or pro-
cesses).  Collectively these problems of attribution make it difficult to assess the 
economic return on R&D, even in industry. 
A further well-known difficulty in evaluating the benefits of f{&D is that deriving 
from the time-interval needed for many results to be applied.  Since evaluations take 
place during or immediately after a programme, these may not yet have been felt. 
A third important point is that Community spending accounts for only about 4% 
of non-military R&D expenditure in Member States, meaning that its impact is diffi-
cult to s)Parate from that of R&D spending by recipients from their own or other re-
sources.  Nevertheless, the Community input may be relatively large in a given area 
for a given recipient. 
1.3  Objectives of  this Report. 
In view of the difficulties encountered in the evaluation of competitiveness, this 
report has the following objectives: 
•  to clarify the meaning of the concept of competitiveness; 
and 
•  to suggest guidelines for evaluation of programmes in 
terms of their impact upon competitiveness. 
The work presented in this report is largely the result of a desk study, though it 
draws upon previous empirical work.  Informal discussions were held with a small 
number of participants in the ESPRIT and BRITE programmes regarding their per-
ceptions of the likely input of their projects on the competitive performance of their 
firms.  The study also benefitted from co~ments  received from members of the 
3  Commission of the European Communities, First Report on the State of  Science and Technology in Europe 
4 SPEAR Network on Methods for Socio-Economic Evaluation of R&D. 
Section 2 of the report reviews some of the recent literature on the nature, meas-
urement and sources of competitiveness in order to investigate what is generally 
understood by the term.  Section 3 then goes on to present a more analytical per-
spective which seeks to explore the consistency of the various concepts of competi-
tiveness through presentation of a dynamic perspective and ultimately to arrive at a 
view of which measures provide the best indication of competitive advantage in par-
ticular circumstances.  Section 4 draws upon the earlier material to set out gui-
delines for the evaluation of the impact of Community programmes on competitive 
performance;  and Section 5 draws some conclusions and suggests some future lines 
of research. 
5 SECTION2 
Definitions of Competitiveness 
In  recent years a plethora of reports, books and articles have appeared on the nature, 
measurement and creation of competitiveness.  Few issues can have enjoyed more 
official attention in the last decade than competitiveness, and it remains the constant 
concern of commentators on the industrial and management scene.  Discussion of 
"technology gaps", of "catching up" and "falling behind" has been commonplace, yet 
little clear agreement has been reached other than that technology is important to the 
competition advantage of firms and nations and, ultimately, to the long run standard of 
living of a nation's citizens.  Three reasons can be put forward to explain why our 
understanding is fragile.  First and foremost the relation between technology and 
competition reaches to the core of the operation of a capitalist market economy, and 
this core is inevitably complex. Even the concepts of technology and competition admit 
divers and often incompatible interpretations.  Secondly, and however important as a 
contributory factor, technology is only one of the elements which determine patterns of 
competitive behaviour and there are no simple ways to isolate the technological from 
other important elements of firm performance.  Finally, technology itself is complex. 
It has many dimensions, it is located in different institutions, and its mechanisms of 
accumulation differ considerably across its different constituent parts. For these reasons 
one of the central tasks in this area is to understand more clearly the nature of technology 
and the processes by which it accumulates.  Our purpose in this section is to review 
some of the leading contributions to this debate, taking this as an introduction to the 
more analytical treatment of the problem which follows in Section 3.  This brief survey 
of the literature establishes without doubt that there is general agreement on what 
competitiveness is but substantial disagreement over important details. Since the details 
are important for policy purposes this lack of agreement is a matter for concern.  As we 
shall see, much of the confusion is related to the different levels at which competitive-
ness may be considered, supra-national, national, regional, industrial and firm.  At each 
level different factors come into play, different indicators are appropriate and different 
policy conclusions follow. 
7 A useful starting point  is the  recent  work by  Porter3 who  draws attention  to competing 
explanations of competitiveness.  Some explanations run in tenns of macroeconomic 
policies (exchange rates, interest rates, etc), others in tenns of availability of labour 
(quantity and quality) and natural resources, others in tenns of industrial policies and 
yet others in tenns of management practices and  capabi~ities. As he rightly comments 
"none of  these explanations for  national competitiveness, any  more  than 
a variety of others that have been put  forward, is fully satisfactory. None 
is sufficient by itself in  rationalizing the  competitive position of  a nation's 
industries". 
His own preferred definition is in terms of  national productivity, where productivity 
is broadly defined, 
"a  nation's finns must relentlessly improve productivity in existing 
industries by raising product quality, adding desirable features, improv-
ing product technology, or boosting production efficiency". 
The clarity of this view is not always matched in the other literature. 
At the level of the individual finn matters seem more straightforward; competitive-
ness is concerned with generating superior product and process attributes relative to 
rivals and articulating these advantages to gain market position.  A recent case study by 
Lehnard4  makes this abundantly clear.  It concerns a household products company 
located in the USA which recognised that over the longer term, 20 years or so, its 
competitive position would be eroded by foreign competition and that it must transform 
its product range and manufacturing processes if it was to survive.  Thus it undertook 
a six year research and development programme to redesign its product range while 
simultaneously automating the production process.  The programme was overwhelm-
ingly successful, cutting labour  requirements from 600 to 171 operatives and permitting 
substantial real reductions (between 42% and 62%) in the real cost of its products. The 
success of the programme was reflected in an expanding market share in US and 
European markets, a 30%  pre-tax rate of  return on the investment and a greatly enhanced 
future design capability.  In short, this company became more competitive by investing 
3  M. Porter, 1990,  The Competitive Advantage of  Nations,  Macmillan 
4  A.P.Lehnard,l987, 'Revatalizing the Manufacture and Design of Mature Global Products'  in B.R.Guile and 
H.Brooks (eds), Technology and Global Industry,  Natural Academy Press 
8 in product and process superiority relative to its rivals and reaped the reward one would 
expect it to reap in an international market economy. 
This differential advantage view of competitiveness is endorsed by the President's 
Commission Study (1985) in the USA. 
"A firm is competitive if it can produce products or services of superior 
quality or lower cost than its domestic or international competitors". 
This carries over to the national level as well but with qualifications. 
"While there are parallels between competitiveness at the firm level and 
at the national level, the definition of the latter is much more complex. 
It is unlikely that all sectors of a nation's economy will  be equally 
competitive in world market.  Success in one industry can reduce com-
petitiveness in another, as wages and factor costs are bid up.  Neverthe-
less, while the definition of competitiveness does not require that all 
industries be equally strong, we reap benefits from maintaining a level 
of diversity in our industrial base." 
Similarly Cox and Kreigbaum 5 identify greater competitiveness with lower prices 
or higher quality compared to rival firms.  The general theme here is one of relating 
competitiveness to market performance, a view endorsed by a separate study  (Cabinet 
Office on Commerce and Trade). 6  There it is argued that 
"no single indicator can adequately measure our competitive standing 
in world markets.  However, competitiveness is best measured by four 
key indicators:  (1)  labour productivity,  (2)  real wage growth,  (3)  real 
returns as capital employed in industry, and (4) position in world trade. 
These measures come closest to reflecting a nation's ability to meet the 
challenges of international markets while increasing the real incomes of 
its citizens. Any one of these indicators can be influenced by factors other 
than competitiveness.  Taken together, however, they present a corrobor  ... 
ating picture of a nation's competitive position.  Each shows a different 
5  J.Cox and H.Kreigbaum, 1989.  ITUUJvation and Industrial Strength. A Study in the United Kingdom.  West 
Germany, the United States and  Japan 
6  Cabinet Office on Commerce and Trade, 1982, An Assessment of  US Competitiveness in High Technology 
Industries 
9 facet of our competitiveness." 
Moreover, the report continues, 
*'Just as it is inappropriate to focus on only one indicator, US perform-
ance along these indicators of competitiveness must be evaluated over 
time. The  trends in these key indicators are at  least as important as  current 
performance.  Trends are essential in assessing our future competitive-
ness  and represent vital  indications of whether the United States is 
making the progress necessary to meet its national goals.  Understanding 
these trends is also crucial to understanding the long-tenn implications 
of the recent economic upturn for US competitiveness". 
We endorse entirely the dynamic view of competition which is entailed by the 
emphasis on trends. 
However it is  intrinsic  to this  market  based  view that not all  sectors can be 
competitive just as not all firms within sectors can be competitive.  As the report 
observes 
"finally, US competitiveness is not defined as the ability of any single 
US industry to remain viable.  H  any one US industry cannot be compe-
titive, then resources should flow to other industries in which they can 
be used more effectively.  This benefits our productivity and hence our 
economic growth. All industries cannot be competitive, because increas-
ing competitiveness in one industry will allow it to build up wages and 
attract resources away from others and reduce their competitiveness. 
Competitiveness also does not distinguish among industries simply due 
to classification as "basic" or "high tech".  Both basic and high tech 
industries can be competitive if they utilise resources productively: any 
industries that cannot will remain stagnant or decline.  It is in the US 
national interest to maintain a broad and diverse industrial base in which 
many industries achieve high levels of productivity. 
The link between technology and market performance is emphasized in a recent 
study from the Office of Technology Assessment.  7.  It is argued that technology is the 
key to competitive success. 
7  Office of Technology Assessment 1990.  Making Things Better: Competing in Manufacturing 
10 "Nations that rely on low wages to sell their goods in the world market 
are, by definition, poor, whereas superior technology raises productivity 
and thus supports rising standards of living.  Moreover, technology is a 
steady, predictable source of advantage, while others may shift with 
political currents.  For example, a nation's fiscal and monetary policies 
affect the value of its currency, which in turn affects the saleability of its 
manufactured goods in the world market  But macroeconomic policies 
are changeable and are far beyond the control of private firms." 
Consequently there are no simple remedies for loss of competitiveness but nonethe-
less the basis of competitive success in the USA is to be found in enhanced technology. 
Increasing investments in physical, human and knowledge capital, developing closer 
links  between firms,  their suppliers  and  customers,  encouraging  the  diffusion  of 
technology to smaller firms and public support for the development of risky long term 
technolo§ies: these are the remedies which are proposed. In  similar vein, Rothwell and 
Zegveld  in their review of technology policies, identify three elements of a balanced 
and integrated technology policy to restore industrial competitiveness.  These are: 
technical opportunity - this defines the capacity to change the ways in which things are 
currently done and includes, for example, the technical and scientific infrastructure; the 
structure and dynamics of the industrial sector  in tenns of propensities to innovation 
and propensities to grow-crudely, this links "demand pull" to "technology push"; and 
the size and structure of market demand - i.e. the incentives to innovate. Together these 
factors constitute the most significant structural dimensions of competitiveness.  Gov-
ernments can intervene to influence each of these elements as well as their interdepend-
ence. 
Within this generally agreed theme of relating competitiveness to market perform-
ance some interesting disagreements emerge.  One concerns the question of whether 
competition is other than a zero-sum game.  Thus in a US Department of Commerce 
publication 
9 it is argued that 
"the principle of comparative advantage should remind us that a nation 
cannot be competitive in all products or services even if productivity in 
these industries is high relative to other countries.  Moreover, efforts to 
make certain industries more competitive will make other industries less 
competitive ...  the situation [is] a zero-sum game." 
8  R. Rothwell and W.Zegve1d. 1981, Industrial Innovation and Public PoliCJ'• Pinter, London 
9  US Department of Commerce, Inten18tiona1 Trade Administration, 1987. Improving US Competitil'eness 
11 By contrast, the President's Commission report argues that 
"competitiveness is not a zero-sum game.  All nations benefit from and 
depend on the economic growth of other nations. As other nations grow, 
they provide large export markets for US gOods  as well as low-cost 
sources of supply for products  in which the United States lacks  a 
comparative advantage. The United States can buy products where it  has 
no advantage from other nations and reallocate its own resources to high 
productivity uses. Every nation can improve its competitiveness, and all 
nations will benefit.  The goal of competitiveness is not to create disad-
vantages for our trading partners but to strengthen and better deploy the 
advantages of America has at its command" 
By way of comment it is clear that this quotation runs together concepts of absolute 
and comparative advantage, resource productivity and competitiveness which could, 
with some justification, be clarified.  It is true that absolute advantage must be distin-
guished from  competitiveness because competitiveness is necessarily a relative con-
cept, indeed it is a tautology to state that an improvement in the comparative advantage 
of  country  A in industry X entails a corresponding increase in the  comparative advantage 
of country B in industry Y.  To that extent comparative advantage is both relative and 
symmetric.  However, we would contend that to equate comparative advantage with 
competitiveness is too simple-minded.  Comparative advantage is a static concept By 
contrast policy makers and industrial managers need to have dynamic concepts of 
competitiveness.  These are bound to be more general in scope than the question of 
resource productivity. 
As far as indicators of competitiveness are concerned there is no clear cut opinion 
to be found, it rather depends on the level at which competitiveness is defined.  As we 
have seen, Porter equates competitiveness to a broadly defined notion of productivity, 
while the Cabinet Office study takes a more eclectic view.  There is general agreement 
that the level of the trade balance of a country is not an ideal indicator.  Thus the same 
Cabinet Office study argues that 
"there is no empirical evidence that nations with current account sur-
pluses have been able to outperform nations with deficits in terms of 
economic growth.  Nevertheless, intelligent examination of our trade 
balance and its composition does provide some indication about our 
competitiveness that merit our concern". 
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 As we shall see in Section 3 there is more to be said on this matter. 
To draw this brief survey together we present in  Table 1  the results of  a comprehensive 
review of measures of competitiveness produced ·by  a  team at the University of 
Bradford.  10  The authors classify these measures in  two dimensions, the level at which 
competition is analysed and uses the time horizon to distinguish between competitive 
perfonnance, its sustainability through the generation of competitive potential and 
management of the competitive process.  The measures indicated place most emphasis 
on competitiveness in foreign markets (which may not be  the case for a firm or  product) 
but this stress is consistent with Community ideas of competitiveness relative to other 
global trading blocks.  The review stresses that single measures of competitiveness do 
not capture all of the elements of the concept and that the measures are inter-related. 
While an  excellent review of  the existing conventional wisdom, it reflects that  consensus 
by emphasising the static aspects over the dynamic.  Since our prime concern is with 
technical change, it is only natural that the latter assumes greater importance.  In the 
next Section, we attempt to build upon the foundations  set out previously but to 
emphasise the dynamic process  which characterises technical change.  From this 
theoretical viewpoint we may then prioritise among the range of measures of competi-
tiveness presented to us. 
10  P.J.Buckley, C.L.Pass and K.Prescott, 'Measures of International Competitiveness: A Critical Swvey'  ,Journal 
of  Marketing Managment, 1988, 4, No.2. 175-200 
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An Analytical Perspective 
In  the previous section we reviewed some of  the recent investigations of  competitive 
performance in modem economies, and it will be clear from this review that there is no 
simple way in which the nature of competitiveness can be summarized.  Whatever it is, 
it is multi-dimensional and it relates to the dynamics of structural change and the 
diffusion of technologies and organisational behaviours.  It is certainly not a time 
independent concept, and the systematic forces which are at work, must be matched 
carefully with those random forces which make the results Lf competition so unpre-
dictable. 
For the policy maker, anxious to improve competitive performance, this is no doubt 
frustrating to hear.  However, a better understanding of  the complexities of  competition 
.can only help the better design and implementation of competition enhancing policies. 
We shall turn to this topic in our final section.  One task now is to present as clear a 
statement as is possible of the nature of competition and of the meaning of, and sources 
of competitive advantage. 
3.1  The Importance of Competition 
Underlying all of the recent concern with the competitive strength of firms and 
nations is, we believe, a perception that it is of primary importance in determining 
standards of living both absolutely, and relatively across nations.  The share of the 
world's wealth generating capability a nation can command, in conjunction with its 
share of the world's population, determines its standard of living.  Competitiveness it 
seems is the key to gaining a greater share of world wealth generation and with it a 
15 higher standard of living.  Moreover, there are good reasons to expect competitive 
success to be cumulative for considerable periods of time so that, to use the well worn 
phrase, 'the rich get richer and the poor get poorer'. While this element of cumulative 
causation is important in the history of nations and firms, it is also true that competitive 
success can be reversed, that nations and finns which seem uncompetitive at one stage 
of history, shake off their constraints and rise rapidly -in  relative importance.  Any 
understanding of competition must be able to incorporate these important elements of 
historical change and turbulence.  Mokyr's recent book 
11is an outstanding account of 
how the technological position of industries and nations can be transformed over time. 
Of  course, it goes without saying, that the competitiveness of  nations is nothing more 
than an appropriate aggregate of the competitiveness of the firms which they contain: 
1neasured either in terms of production or in tenns of ownershipj for in a world of direct 
investment and capital mobility, the two can differ substantially.  To understand com-
petitiveness we have to be sensitive to the different levels at which it is generated and 
of the important feedbacks which link the various levels. 
3.2  Contrasting Views : Equilibrium and Process 
One of the great contrasts of modem economic thought, is the disparity between 
what the economist means by greater competition and what the businessman means by 
greater competition.  At its most fundamental, this is a conflict between competition as 
a state of equilibrium and competitive as a process of change. 
The economist's concern is with the efficiency of market mechanisms in allocating 
given resources in an efficient way, and this has led to  the view of  a competitive situation 
as one in which two independent conditions hold.  First, a situation is more competitive 
the less able is the businesstnan to influence the price at which his product is sold.  In 
the limit of perfect competition, a  firm can sell as much as it wants at a  market 
determined price,  over which it has no influence.  Secondly,  a  situation is  more 
competitive if a firm's profits are closer to the limit at which it would just consider 
keeping its capital in that line of business.  The first condition is a question of market 
structure, perfect competition is more closely approximated, the greater the number of 
competing firms in line of production. The second condition is a question of freedom 
of entry and exit, that is of the mobility of capital and managerial capability within and 
11  J. Mokyr, The Lever of  Riches, Oxford University Press, 1990 
16 between industries. 
It is this line of argument which leads to the contrast between monopoly, a single 
producer, and perfect competition, very many producers, with a whole spectrum of 
monopolistic competition and oligopoly/duopoly situations in between.  What unifies 
this approach is not so much the emphasis on  numbers of  finns and  entry/exit conditions, 
but rather the concern with positions of market equilibrium, that is, situations in which 
no firm has any incentive to change its production or pricing behaviour. 
To the businessman, this is rather difficult to grasp, for it omits what is the most 
obvious element, namely the changes which occur as a result of rivalrous behaviour. 
From this viewpoint, a market in equilibrium is one in which the forces of competition 
have ceased to act.  The economist's view, quite valid in terms of its concern with 
efficient resource allocation, offends common sense when it comes to discussing the 
competitive behaviour of everyday business activity.  Rivalry means behaving differ-
ently from other firms, differently in a way which conveys competitive advantage and 
alters the prevailing balance between the rival producers.  The economist's traditional 
concern with equilibrium simply rules such considerations out of bounds.  As Hayek 
perceptively noted, 
"if the state of affairs assumed by the theory of  perfect competition ever 
existed, it would not only deprive of their scope all the activities which 
the verb  'to compete' describes, but would make them virtually im-
possible" 12 
In short, verbs define actions but in the traditional concept of competition, the use 
of equilibrium denies the possibility for action.  Correspondingly, actions which finns 
take to enhance their competitiveness, price reductions,  improvements in product 
quality, advertising campaigns, are deemed to be imperfections which diminish com-
petition and introduce elements of monopoly that reduce efficiency.  This paradox that 
competitive behaviours are judged to have anti-competitive consequences, is at the root 
of the difficulty in making sense of competition. 
The simple point is that competitive behaviours cannot be understood by reference 
to equilibrium but only by reference to a process of change driven by differential 
12  F. Hayek, 1948, 'Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition' in Individualism and Economic Order, 
Chicago 
17 behaviour.  It is because firms strive to be different that a situation is competitive, and 
clearly the development of technology is of prime importance in this regard.  Some 
additional paradoxes which follow from the equilibrium view are worth noting.  In 
conditions of perfect competition, the firms are not rivals, for by definition they can sell 
whatever amounts they please at current prices.  Indeed, the most competitive situation 
in the traditional view is one in which all rivalry has been eliminated.  This may help 
in understanding outcomes in the world market for wheat or some other standardized 
commodity, but it could not be further removed from the conditions of competition 
among the industrial nations.  Secondly, in equilibrium there can be no scope for 
entrepreneurial behaviour, for entrepreneurship and equilibrium are incompatible con-
cepts.  However,  entrepreneurship is a highly valued business trait precisely because 
of its connotations as a competitive force.  Clearly, the equilibrium view is not helping 
us to come to terms with vital elements of cotnpetitive behaviour. 
Our solution -to this difficulty, is to view competition as a process of change driven 
by  variety in behaviour across firms. It  is an open  ended process in  which new  economic 
states are to be discovered, and while it may not be predictable in terms of its outcomes, 
it is possible to be confident about the mechanisms at work.  The approach we shall 
take may be summed up in terms of the following three questions:  -
a) What dimensions of differential behaviour yield competitive advantage? 
b) What mechanisms generate those differential behaviours?;and 
c) What mechanisms resolve these behaviours into competitive outcomes. 
Clearly this triad forms a  basis for classifying policies to enhance competitive 
performance, as is briefly explored below.  It is hardly surprising that technical change 
is a key element in the process view of competition.  No economist has perceived this 
more clearly than Schumpeter, for his 'gale of creative destruction' depends on the 
differential behaviour of competing firms, and their drive to be different is premised on 
their search for a decisive-cost or quality advantage.  But, innovation is an exploratory 
process and experimental behaviour is a necessary feature of real world competition 
with all the uncertainties and lack of  predictability that this entails. That it appears from 
some points of view to entail duplication and waste of resources is inevitable, for our 
view of competition is that it is a learning process premised on imperfect knowledge. 
There is no more destructive feature of an economic theory than the one which claims 
perfect knowledge for decision makers and policy makers. 
It is often useful to wrap the process view of competition in the metaphor of a race. 
Any  .race has three elements: the competitors and  their behaviours; the set of  rules which 
18 define legitimate competitive behaviour; and the criteria which identify success and 
failure.  Any such race in which all the competitors performed identically, would not 
only be unusual, it would also be entirely predictable and devoid of interest.  For what 
is important about any race is its inherent unpredictability, the scope for surprise, the 
fall  of the favourite, the triumph of the dark horse are the essence of the serious 
competition.  Moreover, while an economic race may have some ~ttributes of a sprint, 
it is perhaps better thought of as a race without an end, in which c  mpetitors join, gain 
benefits along the way and ultimately drop out.  Staying the'd stance becomes the 
principal distinguishing characteristic of the competitive firm.  As. in any race, there is 
an ordering of participants at any point, but being first is not the only satisfactory 
position.  So, it is in competition.  The possibility of competition depends on a 
divergence of views across firms as to the appropriate policies with respect to range of 
products, prices and methods of manufacture.  Thus, the mechanisms by which oppor-
tunities to behave differently arise, and the way in which firms conduct and act on these 
opportunities, are not onl(j central to the competitive race, but central to the policies to 
influence its outcomes. 
3.3  The Competitive Process 
. The first task in  elaborating a process view of  competition is to distinguish carefully 
between the competing units and the environment which selects between their beha-
viours.  Markets provide the environment, markets for outputs as well as markets for 
inputs, and firms compete in both domain~ in terms of prices (e.g. product price and 
\Vages offered to particular groups of employees) and q~lity (e.g. product quality and 
working conditions).  But, markets are much more than price structures.  They are 
networks of formal and informal relationships , 14they have a rate of growth, positive 
or negative expanding or contracting opportunities for competition.  Some markets 
operate continuously, others only at infrequent intervals and questions of the frequency 
of market selection are important to the competitive process.  Compare, for example, 
competition in the defence or nuclear power industries with that in the food industry to 
see the force of this point.  More importantly, markets apply selective pressure to firms 
with different ferocity.  How quickly a firm loses customers if it raises its relative price 
or reduces its relative product quality is of paramount importance in this respect.In a 
tnarket of well informed customers, one might expect this reaction to be rapid, in a 
\Vorld of greater ignorance it is less so.  An important feature of any  market environment 
13  For an extended discussion of this point see L. Georghiou, J.S.Metcalfe et at Post-Innovation Performance -
Technological Development and Competition, MacMillan, 1986. 
14  G.B.Richardson,l972, 'TI1e Organisation of Industry', Economic Jounuz/, vo1.82 
19 is always the degree of intelligence with which users can make their selections between 
rival product/price offering.  Moreover, there is no reason to expect this selective 
pressure to be the same for all firms. Market segmentation is a well known phenomenon 
and firms which have accumulated goodwill from their customers clearly enjoy some 
reduction in selective pressure. 
When we tum to the question of the units of competition, we face one of the issues 
which makes the discussion of competition so complex, namely the different levels at 
which competition operates.  We shall distinguish and discuss competition at three 
different levels,  recognising  that intermediate levels of analysis, for example, an 
industrial sector,  may be appropriate in some circumstances.  These levels are the 
transformation process, the business unit or firm, and the nation.  Before we elaborate 
on the competitive process  we must also dwell briefly on the different dimensions of 
technology which are relevant;  namely, knowledge, skills and artefacts.  Artefacts are 
the most obvious dimension of  technology in terms of  the competition process, they are 
the products and associated methods of production which firms deploy to gain compe-
tition advantage.  For the analysis of technology, the artefacts provide the most direct 
measure of technological progress, either ex post, in terms of past improvement or ex 
ante, in terms of forecast improvement.  Underpinning the capability to produce and 
itnprove the artefacts are the knowledge of skill bases centred in firms and other 
institutions.  (It was recently argued that skills and research manpower are the main 
driving forces of competitiveness15)  Over the longer term it is the ability to create 
these less tangible dimensions of technology which is  the ultimate determinant of 
competition advantage.  With these  distinctions in mind we tum to our three  levels 
of competition. 
The Transformation Process 
At this level we find the basic units of market competition, namely the products and 
their associated methods of manufacture.  We call such a product/process pairing a 
transformation process and emphasize its unity as far as competition is concerned. 
Products cannot be treated separately from their methods of manufacture, differences 
in both dimensions are relevant to the way in which competition operates.  Clearly, 
technology is virtually synonymous with the concept of a transformation process both 
in terms  of the respective  artefacts  and  in terms  of the  skills  and underpinning 
knowledge which make production possible.  Moreover, this is true both at a point in 
time and over time in terms of the opportunities to use enhanced skills and knowledge 
to improve the products and their methods of manufacture.  As we shall emphasise 
15  R.B.Reich, 'Who is Us?' Harvard Business Review, January-February 1990 
20 (4)  . i 
below, the ability of firms to maintain a momentum of improvement in their transfor-
mation processes, is a necessary condition for long tenn competitive survival. 
In introducing technology at this point, we can go further.  Any product and its 
method of manufacture can be presented in tenns of a set of associated petfonnance 
characteristics, the product characteristics determining its application and what users 
will pay for it, and the manufacturing characteristics determining the inputs which are 
required and the corresponding costs of production.  Indeed, a useful tool for any 
analysis of  competition is a mapping of  how the performance characteristics of  different 
transformation processes stand relative to each other, and how they move over time.  A 
map identifies the key performance characteristics which defme competition advantage, 
it identifies the inherent limits on those petfonnance characteristics and plots the 
trajectories of advance for the performance characteristics.  Mapping of this kind we 
see as a fundamental tool for strategy and policy formation.16  Such a device provides 
an immediate picture of the differential behaviour of rival firms in the technological 
dimension. 
Not only is this the fundamental level of market competition, it is the level where 
the process of competitive change is most rapid and the level at which competitive 
advantage is most clearly defined.  In modem conditions the process is played on an 
international stage. 
The Business Unit/Firm 
Every transformation process is operated for a purpose by an organisation and this 
organisation is what we term a business unit, or business for short.  It is the level at 
which all the relevant decisions are made concerning the operation of a transformation 
process.  In the case of small firms, the business unit (the unit of operational manage-
ment) and the finn (the unit of ownership) are one and the same.  For larger firms this 
is rarely so, they typically are organised into several business units each one responsible 
for a given transformation process.  The relation between the umbrella firm and the 
constituent business, is often a key element in the competitive behaviour of the latter. 
Central strategy often determines the funds available for investment, and the perfor-
mance of Rand D activity, both of which greatly influence the petfonnance of business 
units. A crucial point here is that competition at  the level of  the business unit, is different 
from competition at the level of the firm.  If a transformation process is not economic, 
16  M. Boden, 1991, The Identification of  Technology Priorities for European Research and Technology 
Development: A Feasibility Study. Report for the SAST Unit, DG XII, the Commission of the European 
Communities 
21 then it will not survive, nor will its business unit  But, the large firm can readily 
incorporate such changes, diversifying into new business units and diversifying itself 
of existing ones to ensure the survival of the finn as is appropriate.  Indeed, this is a 
major element in  the explanation of  why some firms live so long, they do  so  by  becoming 
different collections of business units in response to competitive pressures. 
Competition at the level of the finn is also different because firms face competition 
in the capital market for ownership.  A top management team which allows its capital 
market quotation to fall relative to the value of the underlying assets is courting a 
takeover from a management team which considers it can perform better.  Moreover, 
the capital market also provides a source of funds over and above that generated by 
internal cash flows and firms compete for access to these funds.  As capital markets 
become more closely integrated, so the competitive pressures at that level increase. 
What one wants of the capital market in this respect is that it works with the grain of 
competition at the level of transformation processes: distributing funds in such away as 
to encourage the relative expansion of the more profitable business units. 
Nations 
Our  final and most problematic unit of  competition is the nation: problematic because 
it is not nations which compete, but rather the firms located in them.  A nation is an 
environment not an active competitive un·it  However, it is always possible to take an 
aggregate of business units in one nation and compare its performance with a similar 
aggregate drawn from another nation and make deductions about competitive perfor-
mance.  Such comparisons are of considerable statistical interest and employed with 
care they can give insights into the underlying process.  This kind of literature was 
reviewed in Section 2 above. 
However, we can give this level of analysis some genuine competitive content if we 
see different nations as competing for the location of wealth generating activity.  Firms 
can choose to locate their productive activities abroad rather than domestically.  Deci-
sions to do so, depend on many factors, some macroeconomic such as tax regimes, 
general wage levels and exchange rates, other microeconomic, such as the supply of 
trained labour, and access to an Rand D infrastructure.  Nations which provide good 
environments prosper, no doubt attracting further wealth creating activity in the process. 
Clearly,  this  is a  level  of competition where  different  national  policies can have 
considerable impact on the relative ~rfonnance of their constituent firms.  This has 
been demonstrated clearly by Porter 
1  who shows the importance of  proximity, location 
and group effects in competitive performance. 
22 Having distinguished three levels of competition, we can now turn more precisely 
to the determination of competitive advantage, concentrating attention for the most part 
on competition at the primary level, namely the transformation process cum business 
unit. 
The fundamental point is to be able to distinguish measure of competitive advantage 
from measures of the consequences of competitive advantage. 
3.4  Dimensions of  Competitive Advantage 
At its most elementary level, competition is the joint outcome of two mechanisms: 
choices by customers across rival products; and, choices by finns as to which products 
to produce at what levels of output. Thus, the basic indicators of competitive advantage 
relate to the quality of a product and the costs at which that product can be produced. 
A business unit has competitive advantage relative to a rival measured in terms of how 
superior is its product and process combination.  Competitive advantage depends on 
being different in these two crucial dimensions.  Thus, one can take as partial measures 
of competitive advantage, any number of indices of  product quality or  input productivity 
remembering  that  their  significance  is  only  to be  found  in  comparison  with the 
corresponding  indices  for  rivals.  Since there exists  a multiplicity of such partial 
measures, an obvious question relates to how they are to be combined together to form 
some overall measure of competitive advantage. 
Clearly, technology in terms of its artefact petfonnance dimensions is central to such 
measures of competitive advantage, but technology does not operate in isolation and 
its influence is modified by two sets of factors.  First, as far as manufacturing efficiency 
is concerned, there is an inevitable element of organisation behaviour which is com-
pounded with technology to determine factor productivity.  Firms with similar transfor-
mation processes may operate them in quite different ways, and many productivity 
enhancing innovations are organisational and not technological in a strict sense ('just 
in time' inventory control is an excellent example).  Similarly, competitive advantage 
with respect to product performance can depend on a multiplicity of non technological 
characteristics such as after sales support or intangible design elements which determine 
the morphology of a product.  Secondly, competitive advantages depend on costs and 
product valuations which are determined in part by the relative prices of different 
17  M. Porter, 1990. The Competitive Advantage of  Nations,  Macmillan 
23 productive inputs and the relative valuations which users place on different product 
characteristics.  If two finns experience the same structure of such prices, then their 
competitive advantage reduces to matters of technology alloyed with organisation.  If 
they face different prices (for example, because of  local scarcity of  some inputs or  public 
policies which, say, influence energy prices) then these differences in environment 
influence the appropriate measures of competitive adv~ntage. 
In short,  the prime determinants of competitive advantage are to be  found in 
differences in Unit costs and quality of the competing products.  Effectively, a compe-
titive advantage is any dimension of performance which increases user's preferences 
for a firm's product or reduces the cost of producing that product.  But this is only a 
starting point, for the differences between firms are not given data but are revised over 
time by the very behaviour of rival firms as they seek greater competitive advantage. 
Finns compete over the medium and long tenn in tenns of sequences of innovations 
which enhance the performance characteristics of their products and manufacturing 
methods. Thus, the ability to sustain an appropriate momentum of  technological change 
is the sine qua non of maintaining competitive advantage.  This ability depends on an 
immense range of  factors which may be grouped according to, the opportunity  to make 
innovations; the resources available to do so; and, the incentives to advance technol-
ogy.  Ultimately maintaining competitive advantage depends on being more creative 
than ones rivals. Figure 1 provides an outline sketch of  the principle elements involved. 
It  distinguishes two levels of  competition, in terms of  artefacts in the market place (level 
I) and in terms of momentum of technological improvement (level IT). 
24 Levell 
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25 As far as technological opportunity is concerned a great deal depends on the de-
sign configuration that underpins a particular transformation process.  Technology is 
not infinitely malleable, rather the set of concepts, theories and facts which underpin 
a transformation process shapes and limits the kinds of improvements in technology 
which can be imagined and brought into effect  Design configurations limit ultimate 
performance of a technology and a firm which uses a design configuration of an infe-
rior kind is ultimately doomed to loose competitive advantage.  It is only rarely the 
case that firms operating one design configuration make a successful transition to a 
competing and superior one.  Quite small differences in configuration may constitute 
insuperable barriers to technology transfer. 19  Thus, over the long term the oppor-
tunities to innovate are not spread equally across technologies; the firm with luck or 
foresight is the one which happens to work with the configuration which has the 
greater performance potential. 
Opportunity is only one element in the picture, for innovation is a resource intens-
ive process and the resources which firms can devote to formal and informal R&D 
are crucial in turning potential into actual performance.  Notice that R&D statistics 
are often an imperfect indicator of the true volume of resources devoted to enhanc-
ing a finn's technology.  Not only the resources devoted to R&D but the ability to 
manage the R&D process are crucial here.  Innovation is a question of resources and 
resourcefulness  the key insight may save a considerable degree of R&D effort. 
One cannot predict how creative ability will vary across individual research and de-
velopment employers although it may be the case that the bigger the overall research 
spend the greater the expectation of competition enhancing innovations.  Here we 
see one of the elements of cumulative causation.  Firms with a high market share 
(cet.par) enjoy higher aggregate profits and have more resources to devote to R&D 
thus increasing their chances of gaining further competitive advantage.  Moreover 
they can cross subsidize R&D in one business unit from profits earned in other busi-
ness units.  That large firms do not dominate the innovation process, particularly 
with regard to radical innovations, is a reflection that resources alone are not always 
enough. 
To sum up competitive advantage has two dimensions: at a moment in time and 
over time.  At a moment in time it is measured by those dimensions which indicate 
enhanced product quality or lower cost of production.  Over time it is measured by 
the firms creativity in enhancing the corresponding dimensions of performance. 
19  R.M.Henderson and K.B.Clark, 1990, 'Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product 
Technologies and the Failure of Established Finns', Administrative Science Quarter[y, vo1..35 
26 It is immediately apparent that a variety of technology policies may be directed to-
wards the enhancement of competitive advantage in single firms or groups of firms. 
. Br<;>adly speaking they can be divided into policies aimed at improving artefacts (or 
more precisely the performance chamcteristics of a transformation process), at im-
proving skills, and at improving the underpinning knowledge base.  These policies 
may involve directing R&D resources to firms or ensuring that finns link more effec-
tively into the higher education and other R&D institutions in a nation.  Policies may 
also treat firms in isolation or be collaborative ·in nature.  Whatever the pattern the 
proxititate test of their success is how they improve the transformation process to en-
hance competitive advantage. 
3.5  Competitive Consequences 
Thus far we have focused attention on the measurement of competitive advantage 
in terms of product quality and unit cost recognising that each of these can be ex-
pressed in terms of many partial indicators of competitive advantage.  We now have 
to explain what difference competitive advantage makes to competitive performance, 
for unless there is a clear mechanism linking the two then any definition or measure 
of competitive advantage amounts to very little. 
We begin with one of the key points made in the introduction, that competition is 
a dynamic process and that it is concerned with the changing relative importance of 
different transformation processes.  After all, this is what market mechanisms do 
when they work effectively.  Products which users prefer and products which are pro-
duced relatively cheaply are selected for, over time, they account for an increasing 
proportion of total sales in a market  Thus competition as a process entails changes 
in the relative economic weight of competing transformation processes.  It is from 
this perspective a multi-technology diffusion process.  What we have to establish is 
that this process is linked directly to differences in competitive advantage as treated 
above. 
The first point to note is that competitiveness is a relative concept.  To talk of the 
competitiveness of a business unit in isolation is meaningless, any indicator which fo-
cuses on a single business or product is without content.  To say, for example, that a 
business is competitive because it earned X% on its capital is an empty statement 
All statements of competitiveness are comparative and involve the pair wise com  pari-
sons of competing businesses, or the comparison of a single business with some ag-
gregate of its competitors.  Thus competitiveness is a chain relationship, a given 
business may be competitive against one firm and uncompetitive relative to another. 
27 In broader comparisons one ca11 compare a  busu1~.ss wun tne aver;  ge of 1ts nvals in 
a particular market context to assess its competttive advantage.  What then follows 
from a knowledge of the finn's post  bon 111  this cham? 
One might expect first that competitive advantage would be reflected in the mar-
ket share of a business, the market betng 1dentu,_ed  (~tb.,lallv With dtffietJ.lty one 
should add) in terms of all those bt&.stnesses selltng produ~1:s wrucl1 are used for the 
same purpose by an identified group of customers.  But in leading us to the position 
that a more competitive business is one with a relatively high market share this is 
clearly misleading.  Market share is a static measure. At best, share of market is a re-
flection of past competitive performance, what we need is an appropriate dynamic 
measure.  However, when we turn to the change in market share over a given time 
period matters are immediately more clear cut, and the following definitions suggest 
themselves: 
•  a business is more competitive than its rival if its market share over a given 
period is increasing more quickly than that of its rival; 
•  two businesses are equally competitive if their market shares are changing at 
the same rate. 
More generally we can say that a finn is competitive if  its market share is increas-
ing and uncompetitive if its market share is declining.  H its market share is constant 
then it has neither competitive advantage nor disadvantage.  Notice carefully that 
while the change in market share is the measure of competitiveness this does not rule 
out the possibility that competition advantage depends on the level of market share, 
through factors such as scale effects.  We simply emphasise that because competitive-
ness is a process, the measures of competitive outcomes must be based on the meas-
urement of change. 
These definitions require a little more explanation.  Naturally they depend on the 
length of time period chosen for the comparison, a period which eliminates short 
term market noise and the general effects of the trade cycle is desirable.  What this 
period is will vary from one market context to another and depends in part on the 
frequency with which consumers make competition choices between rival products. 
In some markets choices are made continuously and the time period for defining 
changes in market share will be short.  In others, e.g. defence capital equipment 
choices are made at infrequent intervals and the corresponding time period must be 
longer.  Furthermore, by changing market share we mean market share which is sus-
tainable, that is, consistent with the fundamentals of competitive performance.  A 
business can buy market share in a temporary fashion if  it reduces its price drasti-
28 e;aHy but unle&s it has the <..apa(.;Jty  a.o  ~upply tr.e erealbr market this will not be a sus-
tainable strategy.  In ar1y p114c-tical  ~hu~tion ttte 1df-nttftcation of the relevant market 
may present considerable cttaHtnges, espeually m periods of rapid technological 
change.  These quahfil:attons apart, the tn1pon.ant point about the change in market 
share cntenon is that u ca.ptures the oynarntcs ot change, in a simple yet powerful 
way.  How ts the change 1n rnarket share crH~cton related to the measurement of com-
pel1ltve advantage? 
Again \Ve are faced w1th the tnherent complex  tty of the concept of competition 
and we have to step back to the underlying elementary, fundamental market pro-
cesses. 
Cunstder a bustness whose rnarket share tS  increa~tng steacWy over time.  We can 
(teat dus from two ctrtgit:s, growth m rr.arke( dernand and expansion of the capacity 
to supply the product in question.  On the demand side the price of the product and 
its quality relative to rivals must be such that consumers are switching towards this 
product, more and rnore users accept it and reject other products when making their 
purch&Mng df-A;.tSiOflS  Ufl th.e  ~uppiy  Stele the t1rrn rrtUSt be ab1e to vahdate the in-
Cft,asmg dt:-mand wtth an eApandtrtg rate of production,  That is the pnce must be 
such relatl  ve to the urut cost of production to induce the required rate of expansion 
and provide the flow of investment funds which is required so to do.  A higher price 
relative to rivals would mean a higher rate of capacity expansion and a lower rate of 
demand growth, and conversely for a lower price.  When the market overall is not de-
clining over time the forces of competition lead to a rather obvious result, namely 
that businesses maintain a rough balance between the size of their market and the ca-
pacity to supply it.  Competition in declining markets, where there is systematic ex-
cess capacity, raises some interesting problems but this is rarely the situation found 
in technologically intensive industries.  The upshot of all this is that the quality of 
the products a firm supplies and its cost of production taken relative to the average 
of those of its rivals, determines its profitability and whether its market share is in-
creasing or declining over the relevant time period. 
The relation with competitive advantage becomes clear if we take a case in which 
all the businesses would grow at the same rate if  they enjoyed the same profitability 
cum rate of return on invested capital. Differences in growth are traceable directly to 
differences in profitability.  This is a special case but it leads to an important result. 
Namely a business which is increasing its overall market share must have a positive 
competitive advantage relative to the average for its rivals, where competitive advant-
age is measured in terms of a combined index of product quality and unit cost of pro-
duction.  Competitive advantage translates directly into increases in the economic 
29 importance of that business in the market place.  Correspondingly for the finn with 
declining market share.  It follows that a firm whose market share is constant has 
neither competitive advantages nor disadvantages on average relative to its rivals.  It 
is at an advantage relative to some and at a disadvantage relative to others in the 
chain but overall these positive and negative effects wash out 
This base case is instructive for it provides us with the conditions under which 
changes in market share are related to competive advantage in the way we would ex-
pect, that is, firms with advantages improve their market position over time.  A better 
quality product attracts demand and increases profitability, so that output can grow 
faster and market share increase.  Similarly, a lower cost of production enables price 
to be lower to attract demand and profitability to be greater so that capacity can in-
crease.  Either way the causation is the same: from competitive advantage to profita-
bility to changes in market share, that is, changes in the relative position of a 
business in the market place.  The crucial point to emphasise is that it is the dif-
ferences betw~inns  in product quality and unit cost which drive this dynamic pro-
cess.  So far the argument has hinged on all the competitors having a common 
propensity to expand.  If  this is not so and the propensity to expand is positively 
correlated with  profitab~ty, an outcome which might be imposed by an efficient 
capital market, this would reinforce the link between competitive advantage and 
changes in market share.  Indeed the operation of the capital market is central to the 
dynamics of the competitive process.  To sum up, the competitive consequences of a 
firm's competitive advantages depend crucially upon the working of several aspects 
of the market mechanism.  There is no simple link between competitive advantage as 
conventionally understood and the dynamics of the competitive process.  Thus a tech-
nology policy aimed at enhancing competitive advantages may be successful on its 
own terms and yet not have the desired effect in tenns of wealth creation because the 
competitive process is distorted in some other directions.  This leads us to a general 
proposition of some importance.  The returns to technology policy are enhanced the 
more other policies ensure undistorted product markets which choose fairly and effi-
ciently between the products of rival producers, undistorted factor markets which are 
free of localised imperfections, and undistorted capital markets which distribute pro-
portionately more resources to finns with greater competitive advantages, that is, 
firms which are intrinsically more profitable. 
3.6  The National Picture 
One advantage of the dynamic approach is that it aggregates readily to the na-
tionallevel, permits international comparisons, and provides a direct link with 
30 changes in the balance of trade of competing nations. 
The analogue to market share for a nation as a whole is the share of the world's 
wealth generating capacity (industry by industry or for national productive activity 
as a whole) located within its borders.  The difference between this and the share of 
world consumption of the same products taken by its population translates directly 
into its balance of payments (trade account) when the latter is expressed as fraction 
of its domestic production.  A payments deficit occurs when a nation's share in world 
consumption exceeds its share in world production, and conversely for a surplus. 
But like the ~ket  share level of the previous section the balance of payments indi-
cates nothing about current competitiveness, it is at most a cumulated reflection of 
past competitiveness.  However, the current change in the balance of payments 
yields a different story.  Notice first that the overall share of a nation in world con-
sumption is likely to change relatively slowly under the influence of relative popula-
tion and per capita income growth.  Even at the industry level it is likely to be 
relatively sluggish.  However, the same is not true for shares in world production 
which empirically can be seen to change substantially in a short space of time.  Any 
reduction in the share of world production is matched by a decline in the trade bal-:-. 
ance ratio and it is this decline which is indicative of lack of competitive advantage 
in international markets.  Conversely a rising production share produces an increase 
in the trade balance ratio.  Thus it is not the sign and magnitude of the trade balance 
ratio which reflects national competitive advantage but rather the sign and magni-
tude of the change in the trade balance ratio.  Given the consequence of enhanced 
national competitiveness is an enhanced share of world productive activity, the link 
between national competitiveness and national competitive advantage follows 
exactly the line suggested above.  Competitive advantage, measured in this case 
relative to world average performance, produces a rising share of world production 
given that the competing nations have equivalent propensities to invest in the capac-
ity to produce. 
Of course this leaves unsaid a great deal about the multiplicity of factors which 
determine natural differences in competitive advantage and the policies which may 
influence these differences.  Without in any way attempting to be exhaustive, the fol-
lowing classification may nonetheless be useful.  At a general level are policies 
which determine the national environment faced by all firms without any intended 
bias between industries and firms.  The exchange rate, taxation, industrial relations, 
public support of education and scientific research would be typical 'climate setting' 
policies.  Clearly they influence the profitability of domestic production and to this 
extent repel or attract flows of overseas investment.  Such policies also impinge di-
rectly on the efficiency of market selection mechanisms, particularly with respect to 
resource mobility and the efficiency of the capital market.  At a second level, 
\. 
31 policies may be targeted at particular groups of firms (not always coterminous with a 
single industry) with the aim of enhancing the competitiveness of the group.  Sup-
port of collaborative research is a good example of a group support policy which ex-
tends to users and producers of a particular set of technologies.  Such policies may 
be further subdivided into those which influence the rate of experimentation in new 
technology and those which influence the diffusion of new technology by encoura-
ging growth in production and application.  At a third level are policies which target 
the performance of individual firms and business units, as with specific R&D sub-
sidies. 
It has not been our intention to provide a full taxonomy of policy but we consider 
the following distinction between levels and purposes shown in Thble 2 is worthy of 
further elaboration.  It will be clear that the precise policy instruments employed 
need to be sensitive to the distinction between levels and forces drawn here.  Indeed 
this provides the convenient stage to make a transition to the third section of this 
paper, when we treat the more practical aspects of competitiveness and evaluation. 
Table2 
Focus  Level 
Business Unit/Firm  Industrial Group  Nation 
Rate of innovative  R&D subsidy  Collalxntive  Support foc 
experimentation  programme  training and 
research 
Rate of selection in  Information  Exchange rate/ 
market  dissemination policy in  control of inflation 
new technology 
regulatory policy 
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Guidelines for Evaluation 
4.1  Introduction. 
In  this section, the aim is to draw upon the preceding analysis to set out  some general 
guidelines for panels charged with the evaluation of Community R&D programmes 
when they come to consider the impact of  those programmes upon the competitiveness 
of European industry.  These guidelines are not intended to be prescriptive or to cover 
all possible circumstances. Rather, the more limited objective is to offer those perfor-
ming evaluations in  which the impact of R&D on competitiveness is within their scope, 
a  checklist of issues  which will  help  them  to formulate  their own strategies for 
assessment of the extent to which this objective is being achieved. 
4.2  Implications of  the Analytical Perspective 
In compiling these guidelines, the analytical perspective has provided a framework 
which has highlighted a number of issues which should be included in an evaluation of 
the impact upon competitiveness. To translate the conceptual treatment into a guide for 
action we consider five conclusions emerging from the discussion in Section 3: 
(i)  Competition is a process of change driven by variety in behaviour across 
firms. 
33 The implication here is that when looking at a programme there should be an ex-
pectation that some projects represent experiments and that a proportion may be ex-
pected to fail in technological or market terms.  Fear of failure should not cause 
programme managers to foreclose options and thus reduce variety.  In  horizontal  ' 
evaluations, the same point may be applied in reference to the portfolio of pro-
grammes.  An evaluation should look for evidence of these characteristics. 
(ii)  The ability to sustain an appropriate momentum of technological change 
is the sine qua non of  maintaining competitive advantage. 
We should emphasise the process view of competitiveness.  The most effective 
Community actions are those which have a sustained effect on the behaviour of 
firms.  Changes  in behaviour in respect to collaborative behaviour provide one 
example of this.  Structural changes in industry or in its conduct of research are an-
other.  Explicit attention should be given to behavioural impacts. 
(iii)  Three different dimensions of technology are relevant: knowledge, skills 
and artefacts. 
Evaluations must be sensitive to the production of all three of these dimensions. 
There has tended to be an excessive emphasis on the artefact dimension.  Patents and 
products are important but they are not the sole means of industry benefitting from 
R&D.  The skills dimension highlights the need for the production or enhancement 
of human resources through the performance of R&D. This is consistent with the 
process view outlined above.  The third dimension, knowledge is difficult to measure 
as a 'stock' but for evaluation purposes it is more important to look for a 'flow'. If 
knowledge is to be applied to new products and process, then technology transfer 
needs to take place.  This may be intra-firm, between R&D performers and produc-
tion divisions, or cross organisational boundaries.  Evaluations should place strong 
emphasis on assessment of the effectiveness of technology transfer. 
(iv)  The relationship between the umbrella finn and the constituent business 
is often a key element in the competitive behaviour of  the latter. 
Industrial structure is likely to have an effect on the firm's ability to exploit its re-
sults for competitive advantage.  Evaluations need to be clear about the unit of ana-
lysis, which should normally be the operating unit, but also take account of the 
support from parent companies.  For this reason, the case of SMEs may need to be 
considered separately. 
(v)  Competitiveness is a relative concept 
It follows that any questions addressed to firms about their achievements, either 
in technological or market terms, should ask them to place these in the context of the 
position of their rivals.  Technology should be examined in terms of changes in the 
distance between firms in terms of key characteristics, and as discussed above, mar-
kets should be examined in terms of rate of change of market share. 
34 4.3  Advance Preparation - Clarification of  Objectives. 
When programme objectives are articulated during the formulation and approval 
stages, those responsible should ensure that it is clear to what extent the programme 
is justified in tenns of its contribution to industrial competitiveness.  This may be 
a relatively unimportant element for programmes which aim to support Community 
objectives in other spheres (e.g. the environment) or which are primarily concerned 
with basic research.  In these cases other issues may be given higher priority in terms 
of evaluation efort.  A good indicator of the extent to which a programme is likely to 
be addressed  towards  enhancement of competitiveness  is  the  intended  degree  of 
industrial participation. 
As far as is possible, those concerned with defining objectives should indicate in 
concrete tenns what  they mean by improvements in competitiveness and the route 
by which they envisage these being achieved.  For example, are new or improved 
products or processes intended and are these in existing or new markets? Who is likely 
to exploit them?  On what timescale? At this stage answers are likely to be at a rather 
aggregated level but will indicate the general thrust. 
This exercise should be repeated at the project selection phase. Individual applicants 
are already required in some cases to indicate their plans for exploitation of results. 
Nevertheless, selection is frequently dominated by  technical criteria. The infonnation 
given by finns at the application stage provides panels with a resource which 
enables tinns' own assessments of competitive potential to be identified, but only 
if they are required to make fairly precise statements. This would have the benefit of 
improving project selection. 
At least at the project level, and sometimes at the programme level, objectives may 
be revised in the light of changing circumstances (including changes in technical or 
market conditions.  Such changes should be noted by the evaluation and, if necessary, 
commented on.  If the available overall objectives are very general and programme 
objectives are rather specific then it is useful to relate the two in hierarchical form using 
a technique such as a logic chart.  This helps to assess whether specific objectives are 
consistent with the achievement of overall objectives. 
35 If the type of information described above has not been compiled at an earlier phase, 
then it should be requested from the programme management at an early phase of the 
evaluation.  If it is not produced in sufficient detail at this stage, then the evaluators 
need to infer for themselves what the objectives were in this respect. As with all formal 
objectives, the evaluation need not be constrained by them in its scope.  For 
example, an element of basic research may have been exploited particularly rapidly, 
leading to a contribution to competitive perfonnance. The evaluators may feel that the 
objectives themselves were not appropriate and to comment on this. 
4.4  Scope of  the Evaluation. 
Evaluators will need to maintain clarity on a number of issues which define the scope 
of the evaluation, including the level of analysis, how European industry is defined, the 
coverage of the programmes being evaluated and, associated with these, the impact 
upon non-participants. The industries to be covered are defined by the scope of the 
programme being evaluated, except in the case of a horizontal evaluation. 
Evidence may be required at a number of  levels.  Where the benefits of a project 
are captured in a single product it is less difficult to assess perfonnance as the product 
may be compared with those of  rival firms (and with where the participating firm would 
have been without assistance).  However, many pre-competitive programmes empha-
sise process developments and here the benefits are realised in more general improve-
ments in firm performance.  Aggregation of projects may allow a synthetic view of 
programme impact but whre there is a large number this can be a costly exercise. On 
the other  hand, top down approaches which attempt  to relate  sectoral performance 
to programme impact are normally hampered by the small scale of Community 
programmes relative to overaU industrial R&D expenditure  as well as the problems 
of timing and attribution. This issue is returned to below. Finally if  the panel is expected 
to comment on the competitiveness of European  industry,  since as we have seen 
competitiveness is a relative concept, comparison must normally be made with the 
situation outside Europe.  Impacts  of R&D programmes are not  felt  solely  by 
participants.  Both positive and negative impacts may be felt by non-participants 
and these need to be taken into account. 
36 4.5  Contextual Information. 
For reasons elaborated throughout this report, it is not nonnally possible to relate 
overall sectoral economic performance directly either to the Framework Programme 
as a whole or to individual initiatives. Nevertheless, an evaluation of an indus-
trially-orientated R&D programme needs to be infonned about the context 
both before and after.  Questions which might be raised include: 
•  Have appropriate industries/technologies been selected for assistance? 
•  Should support be more or less targeted/concentrated? 
•  Is sufficient provision made for variety and experimentation? 
•  What balance between basic, strategic and near market support is optimal for 
different types of finns? 
It is not generally cost-effective to can-y out broad ranging studies of  the 
state of  aspects of European industry within the budget of  a programme evalu-
ation.  Instead, evaluators need to make the best possible use of existing information. 
Information on the technological standing of European industry in the fields con-
cerned may be a part of the background experience of evaluators.  In addition, there 
may be in existence reviews commissioned by technical departments of the Com-
mission.  More general indicator-based studies may also be drawn upon, for 
example patents, technometrics and bibliome1rics, though each has its limitations 
and requires expert interpretation. 
The market perfonnance of technology-based industries may be examined by 
looking at changes in market share for a selection of products and changes in trade 
balance ratios for industrial sectors, as recommended in Section 3.  Such statistics 
are collected by other parts of the Commission, other organisations such as OECD 
and by market analysts. 
To address the issue raised in 4.3 regarding the contribution of Commission 
Funds it is useful to have data on this by sector (or sub-sector if  possible), relative to 
industrial R&D expenditure (including national support).  While this is a small pro-
portion overall it may emerge that for some countries and some sub-sectors the pro-
portion is considerably higher.  Statistics on the size of finns supported and types 
of research undertaken are also relevant. 
37 4.6  Motivations of  Firms. 
In the introduction to this report it was noted that programmes were initially de-
signed, or at least justified according to a rationale which stressed precompetitive col-
laboration, with cost-sharing at least implicit as a motive.  However, empirical 
studies of collaborative R&D have indicated that finns undertake it for a number of 
motives, all of which satisfy our general criteria for enhancement of competitive per-
formance, by offering over time superior products or, reduced costs and sustaining 
the creativity necessary for survival..  20  These motives include the following: 
•  most commonly, finns do not collaborate with direct competitors in the area 
of competition but rather seek complementary capabilities which open new 
opportunities for them. Complementarity generally arises from a  combination 
of different knowledge bases to form a new technological system.  It may also 
operate in a vertical dimension through suppliers and users working together 
so that the former's products are more closely tuned to the latter's needs and 
hence gain a competitive edge. 
•  the traditional reasons of cost-sharing, where a minimum critical mass or 
facility is required, and risk-sharing where collaborators agree to pool results 
(having pursued different options) are also present  However, it is a frequent 
evaluation finding that collaboration takes longer and costs more than single 
company working so the benefits tend to lie in achieving what was not 
otherwise  possible rather than in efficiency gains. 
•  some collaborations are designed to establish standards, or to influence their 
development. In industries such as telecommunications this can lead to 
important sources of competitive advantage. 
•  strategic motives for collaboration include identification of new markets, 
joining new networks, and exploring potential for mergers and acquisitions. 
20  L.Georghiou, K.Barker and R. Williams, 'Strategic Management of Internal Collabomtion', paper presented to 
workshop in Rosnaes, Denmark, May 1990. "Process of  Knowledge Accumulation and the Formulation of 
Technology Strategy" 
38 •  financial motives, that is taking part in order to gain monetary support for 
R&D should not be ignored.  An important evaluation issue is whether the 
support received leads to additional expenditure by the firm (as opposed to 
substituting for expenditure already planned). 
In summary, since the purpose of R&D support for industry is to help industry 
achieve its own strategic goals, then it is important to understand the varied mechan-
isms by which the firms themselves expect to enhance their competitiveness.  Evalu-
ations may be informed by: 
•  case-studies 
•  interviews with participants; and/or 
•  surveys of participants 
4.  7  The Contribution to Competitiveness of  Longer-'Thnn 
Research. 
Some Community programmes, and parts of others, are primarily concerned with 
basic research.  This work is mainly, but not exclusively, carried out by academic 
and other long term research organisations.  As might be expected, the problems of 
timing and attribution loom even larger in attempting to assess their economic im-
pact. The balance of effect is on the side of creativity, providing knowledge that may 
be exploited in unforeseen ways.  Knowledge of this type is often in the public do-
main and therefore more easily appropriated by firms outside Europe (and vice 
versa). Indeed, competitive differences between firms may lie more in their differen-
tial ability to gain access to this public sector knowledge base.  This is not to chal-
lenge the important contribution such research makes to economic performance.  It 
does, however, present practical problems for evaluators asked to pronounce on the 
contribution of a specific programme to competitiveness.  Two limited approaches 
are possible: 
•  At the level of the project, evidence of dissemination and transfer of ideas 
is desirable since knowledge is unlikely to be exploited unless the above 
stages occur.  This issue is addressed in more detail in the next section. 
39 •  At the European level, projects of this kind produce knowledge in parallel 
with enhancing the skills base of economies.  As such they provide an 
important factor in the competition for location of wealth generating activity, 
providing a healthy base for European industry, and attracting further inward 
investment  Evaluations may collect evidence on the manpower effects of 
programmes, including both the personnel who worked directly on projects 
and those who were trained in association (including doctoral dissertations). 
Beyond this, it is rather difficult to comment on these longer-term programmes in 
the context of their contribution to competitiveness.  Other issues such as scientific 
merit and implementation efficiency remain for comment. 
4.8  Technology 'Ihmsfer Within and Beyond Projects 
As argued in Section 4.2, the process of technology transfer is critical to the im-
pact of the programmes on industry.  Past evaluations have indicated that the diffu-
sion of knowledge from those performing R&D to those in a position to apply it to 
new or improved products or processes is an important barrier to exploitation.  21 
Reasons for failures in this dimension include the commitment of senior manage-
ment, lack of a skilled user base able to take up results, lack of interchange of person-
nel and lack of an initial exploitation strategy for the project.  This area is not well 
understood but is clearly of great importance.  Evaluations need to include it within 
their remit.  In practice, this also means being sensitive to the different types of 
knowledge produced (e.g. tacit and codified) and associated transfer mechanisms. 
Any benefits beyond the participants are dependent upon transmission of results 
to third parties.  This is of particular significance to industrial competitiveness when 
the participating organisations are of a type not able to exploit results themselves, for 
example research associations, public sector laboratories or universities.  Some fol-
low through on the extent to which they are able to transfer results to industry would 
give a better idea of the extent to which industry benefits from EC-funded R&D. 
21  K.Guy, L.Georghiou et al, Evaluation of  the Alvey Programme for Advanced Information Technology, HMSO, 
London,1991 
40 4.9  Assessing the Impact of  Programmes on Industrial 
Competitiveness -Generic Questions. 
Each programme will raise specific questions for those charged with evaluating it 
and many of these will not emerge until the evaluation is in process.  This section is 
not meant to replace these but to provide a checklist in the form of a set of generic 
questions which are likely to be relevant to a number of programmes in the context 
of assessing their economic impact.  For convenience these are divided into three ca-
tegories: 
Technological 
To what extent have the technical objectives of programmes been achieved? 
As a result of the programmes have the firms concerned gained or lost ground 
relative to their competitors (a) within and (b) outside the Community? 
How appropriate have the technical objectives been in the light of the actions of 
competitors? (past evaluations, interviews with strategists in industry, the Com-
mission and independents). 
Structural 
What behavioural changes have been induced by participation? (e.g. increased 
collaboration skills, propensity to collaborate with fonner or new partners after fund-
ing has ceased). 
What contribution has the Framework Programme made to skills and research 
manpower in the Community?  Mechanisms include movement of firms into new 
areas, increases in personnel in areas, direct training support (where the destination 
of those qualified is industry). 
What have the effects of the programme been on the structure of the industrial re-
search community?  (rationalising and uniting fragmented resources, allowing aca-
demic research to be drawn upon, integration across technological areas) 
41 Exploitation/mark....,....ted 
What evidence is there of products, prototypes, patents or plans to achieve them 
attributable to Framework projects? 
To what extent have new techniques, tools, processes or other forms of knowhow 
been utilised by participants/other finns? 
How well bas  the technology transfer  process  within participating finns been 
working?  (e.g. have operating divisions taken up results produced by R&D depart-
ments?) 
Has knowledge been diffused to non-participants? 
What investments have fums made in further research or exploitation of results? 
What factors have prevented or  obstructed exploitation? (e.g. changes in strategy of 
participants or their partners, technological developments making  outputs obsolete, 
inadequate investment resources). 
In  the areas a4dressed by the projects can any changes in  market share be discerned? 
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Concluding Remarks 
In this final section we shall summarise the core of our previous discussion and 
suggest ways in which the process of evaluation can be enhanced. 
On competitiveness our central theme has been clear:  competitiveness is dynamic 
and it is  relative.  It is concerned with the changing market position of different 
technologies and finns and with the policies and actions which generate those changes. 
As we have seen in Section 2, many policies and actions influence competitiveness but 
they do so through two principal routes: 
•  by generating differential behaviours across competing firms;  and 
•  by resolving those different behaviours into changes in  relative market 
position. 
In practical tenns this  implies that we look at the connection between  policy 
instruments such as R&D support and the creation of differential advantage.  For 
example, how European R&D policy increases the relative technological position of 
European firms  in terms of products and the underpinning processes.  As we indicated 
in Section 3, differential technological advantages arise at three levels: 
•  the underpinning knowledge 
•  the skills to translate knowledge into effect or action; and 
•  the artefacts which are subject to competition in the  international marketplace. 
43 At each level the policy instruments are different and the indicators of  policy impact 
are also different. 
For the evaluator charged with assessing the impact of EC R&D programmes we 
have suggested a number of practical guides consistent with our general framework. 
These are: 
•  Ensure that there is a clear understanding of the way in which programme and 
project objectives are intended to impact on competitive perfonnance; 
•  Provide contextual infonnation but do not expect it to be linked directly to the 
effect of programmes; 
•  Ensure that the motives of firms are clearly understood;  and give weight to 
the impact on their behaviour. 
•  Follow broadly the generic issues suggested but ensure that these are adapted 
to the specific circumstances of programmes - there are no automatic 'recipes'. 
We conclude with a warning.  ·It is implicit in our discussion of  competitiveness that 
it  is a process operating over  an extended period. Success at  one point in  the  competitive 
process need net entail success in a longer time perspective.  Consequently evaluation 
issues need to be framed with a clear understanding of the time dimension of competi-
tion.  Furthennore the fact that competition is dynamic and multi-dimensional means 
that it is a complex phenomena.  Hence it is not generally possible to attribute uniquely 
consequences to particular policies.  The difference which policies make are often 
difficult to identify because of the complexity and multiplicity of sources.  Used with 
care and due regard to the historical context the approaches and indicators we have 
proposed provide a coherent and fruitful way to approach these complex issues.  This 
brief review has exposed the need for more detailed understanding of the competitive 
process and in particular its relation to the policies and actions which constitute the 
Framework programme. 
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